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Abstract
Qualitative researchers sometimes talk about objectivity in relation to qualitative data
sets. In this paper, I defend a reconstructed notion of objective qualitative data sets
that may serve as a useful and reachable guiding ideal in qualitative data generation.
In the first part of the paper, I develop the ideal. According to it, a qualitative data
set is objective to the extent that it, in conjunction with true assumptions, possesses a
combination of good-making features (epistemic values, epistemic virtues) in virtue
of which the data set is suited to serve as evidence base for a satisfying answer to the
research question under study. In the second part of the paper, I examine and reject two
possible lines of objection to this ideal: One is that it picks out the wrong good-making
features. The other is that the very focus on good-making features is misguided: the
objectivity of a qualitative data set should instead be seen as a matter of how it was
generated or evaluated.
Keywords Objectivity · Qualitative research · Data
1 Introduction
Qualitative researchers sometimes talk about objectivity in relation to qualitative data
sets. For example, Kathleen DeWalt and Billie DeWalt maintain that a qualitative
data set in the form of a “record of observations (field notes) should be as accurate,
complete, detailed, and objective as possible (DeWalt and DeWalt 2011: p. 166—my
italics). Similarly, Matthew Miles, A. Michael Huberman, and Johnny Saldana state
that qualitative data in the sense of “[t]the words we choose to document what we see
and hear in the field can never truly be ‘objective’; they can only be our interpretations
of what we experience” (Miles et al. 2020: p. 7—my italics of “objective”).
In this paper, I take up the idea that qualitative data sets may be more or less
objective. More precisely, I develop an account according to which a qualitative data
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set is objective to the extent that it, in conjunction with true assumptions, possesses a
combination of good-making features (epistemic values, epistemic virtues). In virtue
of these features, the data set is suited to serve as evidence base for a satisfying answer
to the research question under study. I recommend this account on the ground that it
may serve as a useful and reachable guiding ideal in qualitative data generation.
The qualitative researchers quoted a second ago hold that the notion of objectiv-
ity applies to qualitative research. Yet there are also theorists who maintain that the
notion should be completely dropped in the context of qualitative research (see Ham-
mersley 2012). By offering an account of objective qualitative data sets, I obviously
part company with this latter group of qualitative researchers. In my view, the notion
of objectivity is, to borrow Sandra Harding’s formulation, too powerful to be aban-
doned (Harding 2015: p. ix). “Objectivity” is a term of epistemic praise—a stamp
of epistemic quality. Insofar as qualitative researchers renounce on its application
to qualitative research, it may seem as if they do not regard their own research as
being epistemically praiseworthy. I think that qualitative researchers should counter
this impression: properly conducted qualitative research isworthy of epistemic praise.
Thus, rather than give up on the notion of objectivity, it is better to promote an under-
standing of objectivity which may serve as a reachable—and useful—guiding ideal in
qualitative research. I believe that such an ideal is currently lacking and the account I
present is meant partly to fill out this lacuna.
In order to develop an account of objective qualitative data sets, I drawon the current,
very lively, philosophical debate on objectivity. This debate has paid little attention
to questions of objectivity pertaining to qualitative research and the social sciences
more generally. Instead, it has mainly revolved around objectivity in the context of the
natural sciences. Moreover, the debate has not been concerned with “objectivity” as
predicated of data. This latter point is nicely illustrated by Helen Longino’s discussion
of objectivity (Longino 1990). Here, she acknowledges that “[o]ften scientists speak of
the objectivity of data” yet she also makes it clear that her analysis does not deal with
this topic (ibid. p. 63). In view of this situation, my ideal of an objective qualitative
data set does not take off from any existing accounts to this effect. Rather, it takes
its inspiration from an account of objective knowledge claims recently put forward
by Alison Wylie (Wylie 2004; Chapman and Wylie 2016). To be more specific, my
ideal takes over the basic idea informing the notion of objective knowledge claims and
develops it into an account of objective qualitative data sets.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, I offer an introduction to qualitative
methods of data generation. In Sect. 3, I briefly present Wylie’s account of objective
knowledge claims. On that basis, I move on, in Sect. 4, to lay out the ideal of objective
qualitative data sets. In Sects. 5 and 6, I defend this ideal against two possible lines of
objection and then wrap up in Sect. 7.
2 Qualitative methods of data generation
Qualitative research is widespread in the social sciences, humanities, and health sci-
ences. In qualitative research, data are generated byway ofmethods such as participant
observation, qualitative interviewing, focus group interviewing, and the collection of
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documents. In order to focus the subsequent discussion, I concentrate onwhat are likely
the two most frequently used methods, namely participant observation and qualitative
interviewing (Bryman 2012: p. 493). Thus, I have in mind data sets generated by one
or both of these methods, when talking about qualitative data sets in the following.
Themethod of participant observation has two components. The participatory com-
ponent requires the researcher to take part in the research participants’ ways of life over
an extended period of time. She may participate to different degrees. For example, she
may participate in the weaker sense of merely hanging around or in the stronger sense
of engaging actively in the research participants’ activities. Whatever the extent of her
participation, she should try to be as nonintrusive as possible in the ways of life she
studies, as her immediate aim is not to alter, but to learn about them. The observational
component has it that, while participating, the researcher should observe, in the sense
of notice, what goes on.
The researcher’s observations form the basis for her field data, i.e. field notes. These
detail when and where the researcher made her observations, the people present in the
situation she observed, their physical locations, their nonverbal and verbal behavior,
their equipment, and the like. Furthermore, field notes are phrased “in words that are
as close as possible to the words used by the participants. Indeed, verbatim quotes
should be included to the extent to which the researcher has jotted them down or can
accurately remember them. Specific words, special language, terms, and vocabulary
should be recorded” (DeWalt and DeWalt 2011: pp. 165–166).1
The method of qualitative interviewing requires the researcher to pose questions to
a research participant about (some aspect of) her way of life. In her replies, the research
participant is permitted, or even encouraged, to exemplify her points, to expand on her
answers, to digress, to introduce her own concerns, and the like. Qualitative interviews
may be either semi-structured, unstructured, or somewhere in between. In a semi-
structured interview, the researcher has a list of questions that she goes through. She
maypose them inwhatever order seemsnatural during the interview just as shemay add
questions. In an unstructured interview, the researcher has at most a list of topics that
she wants to cover. She does not introduce these in any pre-fixed order and formulates
her questions as she goes along. As a result, the interaction comes close to an ordinary
conversation.2 In both cases, the researcher should make an effort not to influence
what people say on the issues that come up during the interview. Moreover, as far
as possible, she should conduct the interviews in the settings in which the research
participants live their lives.
The qualitative interview makes possible the generation of interview data, that
is, interview notes. These consist in transcriptions of audio or video recordings of
interviews, or in descriptions of what was said during interviews as based on the
1 A participant observer typically produces other types of notes too. While observing, she may write down
scratch notes that subsequently serve as basis for her field notes. Further, she may keep a diary in which she
records her personal concerns, impressions, etc., and she may make analytical notes in which she reflects
on her field notes, enumerate issues she needs to look into, etc. While these notes are all important, I do not
regard them as part of the participant observer’s field notes as such. For further discussion of issues relating
to field notes and other notes, see, e.g., the classic collection of papers edited by Sanjek (1990).
2 The dividing line between unstructured qualitative interviews and conversations that the researcher has
with the research participants while carrying out participant observation is not a sharp one. For the present
purposes, this is of no consequence.
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researcher’s observations and scratch notes. In addition, interview notes detail other
aspects of the interview situation such as the time of the interview, the setting in which
it took place, and the research participant’s facial expressions and nonverbal behavior
during the interview.
As should be clear by now, I identify the data generated by way of participant
observation and qualitative interviewing with the descriptive claims that make up a
researcher’s field and interview notes. Accordingly, it is an account of the objectivity
of qualitative data thus understood that I present below. In discussions of qualitative
research, this conception of data is common (see, e.g. DeWalt and DeWalt 2011:
p. 157ff;Miles et al. 2020: p. 7; Schwartz-Shea andYanow 2002: p. 460). Yet, there are
also other ones. While their adoption would require some rewording of the subsequent
discussion, they would not change its substance.
For instance, field and interview data are sometimes identified with what transpired
while the researcher carried out participant observation or conducted her qualitative
interviews. Accordingly, field and interview notes are seen as descriptions of data.
From this perspective, the subsequent discussion may be rephrased as dealing with
the objectivity of these descriptions. Other times, field and interview data are taken to
comprise not only the researcher’s field and interview notes, but also her audio and
video recordings of observed and interview situations. Insofar as these recordings are
transcribed and hereby turned into field- or interview notes, the following analysis
may be reformulated as being exclusively concerned with the objectivity of the subset
of data constituted by the field or interview notes. However, it may also happen that
the recordings are used directly as basis for analysis (see Tessier 2012). When this is
the case, the ensuing discussion may be re-described as being about the objectivity
of the researcher’s understandings or mental representations of the recorded doings,
sayings, etc.
In this fashion, nothing hinges on my identification of field and interview data with
field and interview notes respectively. That said, it should be emphasized that I do not
mean to suggest that data in general, that is, however generated, should be equated
with descriptive claims.3 All I maintain is that relative to field and interview data,
it is common, and for the present purposes most simple, to understand these as the
descriptive claims that make up a researcher’s field and interview notes.
3 Wylie’s account of objective knowledge claims
In philosophy of science discussions of objectivity, there has been little concern with
the objectivity of data sets, let alone qualitative data sets. In contrast, objectivity as a
property of theories, hypotheses, knowledge claims, and the like is a recurrent topic in
the debate. In what follows, I briefly present Wylie’s account of objective knowledge
claims and propose that its key idea may serve as a basis for the development of an
ideal of objective qualitative data sets.




Wylie’s account is best introduced via a brief detour to Kuhn’s work. In his clas-
sic paper, “Objectivity, Value Judgement, and Theory Choice,” Kuhn asks what the
characteristics of a good scientific theory are (Kuhn 1977: p. 321). In response, he
states that these include accuracy, internal consistency, external consistency, broad
scope, simplicity, and fruitfulness (ibid. pp. 321–322). Moreover, he proposes to refer
to these good-making features as values because they influence, rather than dictate,
scientists’ decisions about whether a given theory is better than its competitors (ibid.
pp. 330–331).
In the current debate, Kuhn’s reflections have becomemainstream. It is widely held
that theories have good-making features though there are different views as to what
exactly these features are. Likewise, the features are often regarded as values or they
are alternatively referred to as virtues, standards, norms, criteria, and the like. In any
case, it is now standard to specify that the values, virtues, etc. in question are epistemic
ones: they are good-making features in the sense of contributing to the attainment of
truth or knowledge (see, e.g., Elliott 2017: p. 12; McMulllin 1983: p. 18; Steel 2015:
p. 161).
Wylie’s ideal of objective knowledge claims builds upon this Kuhnian tradition. She
contends that knowledge claims, which encompass theories, hypotheses, and similar
research products, are objective to the extent that they realize a combination of epis-
temic virtues. Here is how she puts it: “[a]s a property of knowledge claims, objectivity
seems to designate a loosely defined family of epistemic virtues that we expect will be
maximized, in some combination, by the claims we authorize as knowledge” (Wylie
2004: p. 345). According to Wylie’s list, the epistemic virtues include empirical ade-
quacy, internal coherence, inferential robustness, external consistency, and explanatory
power. In combination and on their own, these virtues are, to repeat, constitutive of
the objectivity of knowledge claims; they are objectivity-making characteristics.
The basic idea informing Wylie’s account, viz. that a combination of good-making
features are constitutive of the objectivity of knowledge claims, may be extended and
adapted to qualitative data sets. To motivate this proposal, note that it makes perfect
sense to ask, similarly to Kuhn, what the characteristics of a good qualitative data set
are. Moreover, a reasonable response to this query is to offer a list of good-making
features in the sense of features that somehow contribute to the attainment of truth
or knowledge. The same point may also be reached via a different route. It may be
registered with Dan Steel that not only theories, but also methods, social practices,
community structures, and the like,maymanifest epistemic values (Steel 2015: p. 163).
This granted there is no obvious reason not to add data sets to the list of items that
may manifest epistemic values (see Zahle 2019). In any case, it is only a small step
to continue by maintaining that a qualitative data set is objective to the extent that it
realizes a combination of epistemic values, virtues, etc. The good-making features of a
qualitative data set are, in combination and on their own, constitutive of the objectivity
of a qualitative data set; they are objectivity-making characteristics and all there is to
a qualitative data set being objective is that it has a combination of such features. As




4 The ideal of an objective qualitative data set
In this section, I start by saying something more about what to understand by a good
qualitative data set and by a good-making feature of a qualitative data set. Next, I
present in some detail a list of good- or objectivity-making features of a qualitative
data set. On that basis, I present a more precise formulation of the ideal of an objective
qualitative data set.
A good qualitative data set, I shall take it, is one that is fit to serve as evidence
base for a satisfying answer to the research question under study. By implication, a
good-making feature of a qualitative data set is one which contributes to making the
data set suited as evidence base for a satisfying answer to the question under study.
In this formulation, “the research question under study” is in need of some unpack-
ing. In qualitative research, the research question is frequently changed during data
generation. Often it is rendered more precise as the generation of data progresses, but
it may also be modified in other ways or even discarded in favor of a different research
question. Obviously, the most important is that a qualitative data set is suited to serve
as evidence base for a satisfying answer to the final research question, that is, the
research question that the study ends up aiming to answer. This being the case, the
research question under study should be taken to refer to the final research question.
The notion of a satisfying answer is in need of clarification too. An answer to a
qualitative research question usually takes the form of a research report or account
describing the findings of a study. For the present purposes, a satisfying answer may
be identified with an answer that is not only true, i.e. it contains no false or incorrect
claims, but also complete, i.e. unbiased or nonpartial (see Anderson 1995: p. 39). No
doubt, there is more to a satisfying answer as also testified by the lively discussions
of this issue in the qualitative research literature.4 Still, from the perspective of the
objectivity-making features I discuss below, there is no need to work with a more
elaborate understanding of a satisfying answer: the features are ones that a data set
must have in order for it to be possible to arrive at a true and complete answer on
its basis. Or differently put, the features contribute to the attainment of a true and
complete answer to the research question under study—an answer that qualifies as
knowledge.
What are then the objectivity-making features of a qualitative data set that renders
it suited as evidence base for a satisfying answer to the research question under study?
In the following, I outline six such features, namely descriptive adequacy, reactivity
transparency, deception transparency, relevance, balance, and sufficiency. This list
is not meant to be exhaustive: there might be further objectivity-making features
that I have not yet come across and I return to this issue in Sect. 5. For now, it
may be registered that the list displays what may be regarded as key objectivity-
making features. In discussions of qualitative research, these features are often invoked,
implicitly or explicitly, as characteristics of a good qualitative data set. However, their
treatment is scattered andmostly cursory. My examination provides a more systematic
and detailed account of them. To anticipate, their scrutiny will bring out that some
4 For an introduction to this debate, see, e.g., Bryman (2012: p. 389ff), Miles et al. (2020: p. 304ff), and
Murphy et al. (1998: p. 167ff).
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of them are only possessed by a data set in conjunction with true assumptions and
that some of them are only had by a qualitative data set relative to a given research
question. I now consider each feature in turn.5
A first objectivity-making feature of a qualitative data set is that it contains descrip-
tively adequate data only, that is, data that accurately describewhat transpiredwhen the
researcher carried out participant observation or conducted her interviews. As noted
above, both field and interview notes should do so in words that approximate as much
as possible those the research participants would use or did in fact use. An example
of descriptively adequate field data are ones that correctly report that the newlyweds
cut the wedding cake together. Similarly, interview notes are descriptively adequate if
they, say, correctly cite an interviewee for saying that she is against Christian wedding
rituals. Evidently, if a researcher mis-describes what she observed or people told her,
a satisfying answer to her research question may not be built upon these notes.
Whether field or interview data are descriptively adequate is sometimes relative to
a research question. To see this, consider an audio-recorded interview with a research
participant who speaks in a dialect. For the purposes of answering some research
questions, it does not matter whether the researcher transcribes the interview using
standard spelling or spelling that conveys the dialect. In other situations where the
focus of the study is, say, local identity, it may be important that the dialect is written
out (see Bailey 2008: p. 129). To the extent that this is the case, it is reasonable to
maintain, the transcript is only descriptively adequate if it conveys the dialect.
A second objectivity-making feature of a qualitative data set is that its data are reac-
tivity transparent. In qualitative research, reactivity refers to the researcher’s influence
on what the research participants do and say during data generation as exemplified by
their diverging from their routines when the researcher is around or by their telling the
researcher what they think she wants to hear. Various features ascribed to a researcher
may have this effect including her role as researcher, her gender, her age,marital status,
ethnicity, or social role(s) in the community under study.
The traditional view is that in order for data to be indicative of the ways individuals
act, talk, feel, think, etc.when they are not under study, the datamust describe situations
without any reactivity. In contrast, the currently dominant position contends that data
about situations with reactivity may be employed too. The data are informative of
social life independently of its being studied as long the researcher is clear on the
nature of the reactivity so that she may take it into account when drawing inferences
from her data (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007: p. 102, Maxwell 2005: p. 109).
This latter idea may be further elaborated by stating that data should be reactivity
transparent: the reactivity, if any, in the various situations described by field and inter-
view data should be clear. To this end, data should be supplemented by true reactivity
assumptions. These assumptions concern whether or not the researcher was ascribed
some feature that might plausibly cause reactivity and, if so, whether and how this
feature shaped the research participants’ sayings and doings. In this fashion, field and
interview data are not, to repeat, reactivity transparent on their own, but only in con-
junction with true assumptions of the sort just mentioned. Evidently, if the researcher
5 The discussion of descriptive adequacy, reactivity transparency, relevance, and balance draws variously
on Zahle (2018, 2019).
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wrongly thinks that she did—or didn’t—influence the research participants in some
situation, she is not in position correctly to interpret her data about it.
Tea Bengtsson’s study of young offenders in secure care institutions may serve to
exemplify the feature of reactivity transparency (Bengtsson 2014). Bengtsson con-
ducted interviews with the young offenders and the data she generated were reactivity
transparent in combinationwith two assumptions: that the young boys regarded her “as
an adult and a representative of ‘society’ and mainstream values and morals” (ibid.:
p. 739) and that this shaped the way they chose to represent their past, their aspirations
for the future, and so on, in the interviews. In light of these assumptions, Bengtsson
saw her data as being informative about the boys’ ideas about the right way to repre-
sent their history and ideas about the future to an adult representative of mainstream
society.
A third objectivity-making feature of a qualitative data set is that its data are
deception transparent. Deception occurs when research participants mis-describe a
situation, omit information, change their behavior, and the like, in order to delude
the researcher. While data that describe non-deceiving research participants are more
straightforward to interpret, data about situations with deception are also telling as
long as the researcher is aware of deception. In other words, what matters is that any
deception is clear to the researcher. Accordingly, data should be supplemented with
true deception assumptions about whether or not the research participants deceived
the researcher and if they did, how and possibly why so. If the researcher wrongly
takes it that the research participants did, or didn’t, deceive her on some occasion, she
will draw wrong conclusions from her data about this situation.
The idea of deception transparencymay be illustrated by a study of massage parlors
by JackDouglas and Paul Rasmussen (Douglas 1976: p. 143ff). Rasmussen’s role was,
among other things, to hang out in a massage parlor and talk to the women working
there. During the first months of the study, the women consistently denied that sex,
too, could be bought at the parlor. Rasmussen’s data to this effect were deception
transparent in conjunction with the assumptions that they were lying to him and this
because they had placed him in the category of potential and actual boyfriends (and so
ones to be shielded from the facts) rather than in the category of potential customers.
Rasmussen learned this well into his fieldwork when one of the women accidentally
let slip a comment about sex, which he was able to follow up on.
A fourth objectivity-making feature of a qualitative data set is that its data are
relevant from the perspective of providing a satisfying answer to the research question
under study. Typically, data only have this feature in conjunctionwith true assumptions
that link whatever is described by the data to the focus of the research: it is in virtue of
these linking assumptions that the doings, sayings, etc. described by the data may be
seen as relevant to providing an answer to the research question.Without relevant data,
it goes without saying, it is impossible to provide a satisfying answer to a research
question.
By way of example, consider Charlotte Davies’ research on the transition to adult-
hood by young people with learning disabilities (Davies 2007). Davies generated a
lot of field and interview data about the young people’s food preferences, what they
usually had to eat, and when they didn’t themselves decide what to eat. At first sight,
it may perhaps seem puzzling that these data should be relevant to her study. Yet,
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the data linked up to the issue of transitioning to adulthood via the assumptions that
the young people and their surroundings associated different food preferences with
children and adults, and regarded the social status of adulthood as going together with
more control over what one eats.
A fifth objectivity-making feature of a qualitative data set is that it is balanced.
This means that the data set as a whole describe all the relevant (types of) people,
activities, settings, viewpoints, events, etc. necessary to provide a satisfying answer to
the research question. In the absence of a balanced data set, the researcher is unable
to offer a satisfying answer to her research question in the sense that her answer will
fail to be complete.
These points may be exemplified by Greg Guest, Emily Namey, and Marilyn
Mittchell’s discussion of one of the authors’ study of contraceptive decision mak-
ing in India (Guest et al. 2013: p. 45). At the beginning of this study, the plan was to
conduct qualitative interviewswithmarriedmen,marriedwomen, aswell as healthcare
providers. However, during the first interviews, it became clear that both mothers and
mothers-in-law have a say on their children’s choice of contraception. Consequently,
interviews with mothers and mothers-in-laws were set up too. In case the researcher
had failed to interview them, the data set would have lacked their perspective on con-
traceptive decisionmaking and their role in these decisions. In short, the data set would
have lacked balance.
A sixth objectivity-making feature of a qualitative data set is that it is sufficient
size-wise: it contains enough relevant (types of) data describing people, activities,
settings, events, etc. to provide a satisfying answer to the research question under
study. For instance, a researcher may need to observe a certain type of activity many
times, before her field notes describe the activity in sufficient detail or allow her to
infer the routine elements in the activity. A more concrete example may be provided
by elaborating on the study of contraceptive decision making mentioned a second ago.
Assume that the researcher had to conduct several long interviews with most of the
research participants in order to exhaust what they had to say on the topic. In this
situation, a single brief interview with each research participant is unlikely to have
resulted in a sufficiently large data set to provide a satisfying answer to the research
question.
In light of these considerations, a more elaborate formulation of the ideal of an
objective qualitative data set may now be set forth: a qualitative data set is objective
to the extent that it, in conjunction with true assumptions, has a combination of fea-
tures including descriptive adequacy, reactivity transparency, deception transparency,
relevance, balance, and sufficiency in virtue of which the data set is suited to serve as
evidence base for a satisfying answer to the research question under study.
It is worth noticing that, typically, this ideal only pertains to a subset of the data
that a qualitative researcher generates during a study. That is, a qualitative researcher
standardly generates more data than ends up forming part of the evidence base for
a satisfying answer to her final research question. For example, this is sometimes
the case because the qualitative researcher changes her research question during data
generation. As a result, some of the data generated prior to the modification of her
research question may be irrelevant from the perspective of answering the research
question she has now settled on. Similarly, the researcher may realize that data she
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thought would be relevant from the perspective of answering her research question are
not so after all. In both these cases, then, the data that lack relevance fall short of this
objectivity-making feature and hence they should not be regarded as part of the subset
of data that serves as evidence base for a satisfying answer to the research question
under study.
The ideal of an objective qualitative data set is recommendable on two grounds.
By providing a list of the features that a qualitative data set should ideally end up
having, it may serve as a useful guiding ideal in the generation and evaluation of
qualitative data sets. Moreover, it represents a reachable ideal: qualitative researchers
may produce qualitative data sets with the key objectivity-making features and do so
when at their best. This is also the view informing their discussion in the qualitative
research literature. For lack of better term, I shall henceforth refer to the ideal as the
reconstructed notion of an objective qualitative data set.
5 First line of objections: replace the listed objectivity-making
features
One obvious way in which to oppose the reconstructed ideal is by arguing that while it
rightlymaintains that the objectivity of a qualitative data set is amatter of its possession
of some feature(s), it goes wrong with respect to the features it picks out. All, or at
least some, of these features should be replaced by different ones. I now consider—and
reject—various ways in which to push this line of objection.
In discussions of qualitative research, the traditional view of objectivity is some-
times identified with the position that social research is objective to the extent that it
has the features of validity and reliability (Dewalt and Dewalt 2011: p. 112; Kirk and
Miller 1986: p. 19). Applied to qualitative data sets, this translates into the claim that
a data set is objective to the extent that its data are valid, i.e. they accurately describe
what transpired during data collection, and reliable, i.e. they are reproducible. The
latter means that either the same or a different researcher could generate similar qual-
itative data within the same period of time (say, within the same day or week) or at a
later point in time (DeWalt and Dewalt 2011: p. 112ff). It might be argued that this tra-
ditional conception of objective qualitative data sets is preferable to the reconstructed
notion.
In response, note first that the feature of validity is equivalent to that of descriptive
adequacy. The reason I prefer to talk about descriptive adequacy is that, differently
from validity, it is not a term with multiple and contested meanings. This observation,
though, does not change much: the adoption of the traditional conception would still
mean that the other features, listed by the reconstructed notion, should be dismissed
as objectivity-making characteristics. Yet, by the lights of the traditional conception,
validity/descriptive adequacy and reliability are desirable features of qualitative data
sets. As shown in the last section, so are the features of reactivity transparency, decep-
tion transparency, relevance, balance, and sufficiency. This being the case, why not
admit the latter features as objectivity-making features too? Why insist that valid-
ity/descriptive adequacy and reliability alone are objectivity-making features? In the
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absence of an answer to these questions, the traditional conception must be found
wanting.
This line of reasoning does not dispute the supposition, made by the traditional con-
ception, that reliability is an objectivity-making feature. Accordingly, it may be argued
that the reconstructed ideal should include reliability on its list of objectivity-making
features. Though the addition would not constitute an objection to the ideal—the list
makes no claim to being exhaustive—it would still be an important finding. Hence, it
is worth briefly to pause and examine this issue.
Following the traditional conception, reliability is a desirable feature of qualitative
data sets. However, a data set being reproducible is not desirable in and of itself, but
only insofar as this is suggestive of the qualitative data set being in some respect(s)
fit to serve as evidence base for a satisfying answer to the research question under
study. This means that to claim that a particular qualitative data set is reproducible is
tantamount to saying that the data set likely has one or several of the key objectivity-
making features listed by the reconstructed ideal. Consequently, it is redundant to
add reliability to the reconstructed ideal: what makes reliability a desirable feature is
already covered by the list of key objectivity-making features.
This clarified, consider another notion of objectivity that is sometimes mentioned
in the context of qualitative research. It states that a qualitative data set is objective
to the extent that it contains true aperspectival descriptions, that is, true descriptions
which do not reflect any interpretation of (perspective on) what transpired during data
collection (Miles et al. 2020: p. 7; Kirk and Miller 1986: p. 14).6 It might also be
maintained that this ideal is preferable to the reconstructed notion.
In discussions of qualitative research, it is widely held that the aperspectival ideal, as
it may be called, is unreachable. For instance, in the passage quoted in the introduction,
Miles, Huberman, and Saldana contend that, relative to this notion of objectivity,
data “can never be truly ‘objective’; they can only be our interpretations of what we
experience” (Miles et al. 2020: p. 7—italics in original). Moreover, it is not clear that
it even makes sense to try to approach the ideal. Qualitative data describe research
participants’ doings, saying, etc. in words approximating asmuch as possible those the
research participants use. It may bewondered what more or less aperspectival field and
interview notes look like and, relatedly, why it is recommendable to strive for notes
that are as aperspectival as possible. Until these queries are answered satisfyingly, the
aperspectival ideal should be dismissed too.
So far I have discussed how the reconstructed notionmay be challenged by pointing
to specific alternative objectivity-making features. Another option is to question the
notion bymaintaining that its features should be replaced by a different type of features.
An argument of this sort might draw its inspiration from the debate on the proper
criteria of evaluation in regard to qualitative research reports (answers to qualitative
research questions). Most notably, the dispute turns on whether these criteria should
be the same as, or different from, those applied to quantitative research results. In his
2014, Justin Lee argues against the employment of identical criteria on the ground
that:
6 See also MeGill (1994: p. 2) and Reiss and Sprenger (2014) for a presentation of this conception in more
general terms, that is, independently of the context of qualitative research.
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(s]uch criteria are not technically inappropriate, just not discriminating enough.
This is akin to recommending that soccer players be evaluated by the criterion of
‘fitness,’ which is no doubt valid. However, it is a criterion that is too encompass-
ing since physical fitness is relevant for assessing almost all types of athletes.
Therefore, it cannot tell us what makes soccer players good as soccer players
(Lee 2014: p. 318).
Lee’s line of reasoning is easily extended to qualitative data sets. It might be asserted
that the key objectivity-making features are not distinct to qualitative research. Intu-
itively, data generated by way of quantitative methods, like structured interviewing
or structured observation, should also be descriptively adequate, reactivity transpar-
ent, and so on. As a result, the key objectivity-making features are not discriminating
enough: just as the feature of fitness does not pick out what makes soccer players good
as soccer players, the features fail to capture what makes qualitative data sets good as
qualitative data sets. Hence, the key objectivity-making features should be substituted
by ones that are distinct to qualitative data sets.
The main problem with this argument is that it assumes that an ideal of objective
qualitative data sets should list features that set apart good qualitative data sets from
good quantitative ones. Yet, that is not the purpose of the reconstructed ideal: it is
rather to single out (some of) the features in virtue of which a qualitative data set is
suited to serve as evidence base for a satisfying answer to the research under study.
From this perspective, all that matters is the extent to which the ideal succeeds in
pointing to such features. It is simply irrelevant whether the features are distinct to
qualitative data sets and this issue may be left open.
These reflections conclude the examination of what I consider to be the most sig-
nificant and likely objections to the objectivity-making features mentioned by the
reconstructed ideal. I have demonstrated that the arguments fail to establish that all,
or at least some, of the features should be replaced by alternative ones. It is important
to keep in mind that this point does not add up to the claim that the ideal is complete
as it stands. As noted several times already, the list of objectivity-making features
does not pretend to be exhaustive. The reconstructed ideal points to features that are
objectivity-making in all contexts of qualitative data generation, i.e. relative to all
qualitative data sets. I do not want to rule out the possibility that further features of
this sort should be included into the ideal (though at this point I cannot think of any
more to add). Also, there might be features, which are only objectivity-making in
some contexts of qualitative data generation. For example, maybe some features are
objectivity-making relative to the adoption of a phenomenological approach, whereas
others are objectivity-making relative to the espousal of an interpretive approach, and
so on. The reconstructed ideal is compatible with the addition of such features too.
Future research will have to determine whether the reconstructed ideal of qualitative
data sets should be expanded in these ways.
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6 Second line of objections: focus on process instead
The reconstructed ideal and the objections discussed in the previous section have
in common that they see one or several features of a qualitative data set as being
constitutive of its objectivity. I shall put this by saying that they agree that the ideal
of an objective qualitative data set should be feature-focused. Another option is to
hold that the ideal should be process-oriented: the fact that a qualitative data set
was generated or evaluated in a certain way should be regarded as constitutive of its
objectivity. Longino gives voice to this view in relation to data in general, when she
comments that scientists who talk about the objectivity of data “seem to mean that the
information upon which their theories and hypotheses rest has been obtained in such
a way as to justify their reliance upon it” (Longino 1990: p. 63). In this section, I rebut
the claim that process-oriented ideals of objective qualitative data sets are preferable
to the reconstructed ideal. Moreover, I propose that process-oriented ideals should be
reformulated such that they are rendered compatible with the reconstructed notion.
It is possible to distinguish between two kinds of process-oriented ideals. The first
contends that qualitative data sets are objective to the extent that individual qualitative
researchers generated or evaluated them in a certain way. The notion of objectivity
as value freedom—sometimes mentioned in the qualitative research literature—may
serve to illustrate this approach (see, e.g., Bryman 2012: p. 39, Lincoln and Guba
1985: p. 300). Adapted to the present discussion, it states that a qualitative data set is
objective to the extent that the researcher’s nonepistemic values (such as her moral,
social, and political values) did not influence any of her data generation decisions.
Another notion—likewise mentioned in discussions of qualitative research—is the
notion of objectivity as emotional detachment (see, e.g. Paul 1953: p. 441, Vidich
1969: p. 82).7 Adjusted to the present concerns, it maintains that a qualitative data
set is objective to the extent that the researcher was emotionally detached during its
generation.
Both these ideals are, to repeat, just examples of process-oriented notions of objec-
tive qualitative data sets. As such, there is no need to go into the question of whether
qualitative researchers are well advised to proceed in the manners they recommend.
What matters is that they bring into view the appeal of ideals of this sort: these ideals
provide guidance as to what qualitative researchers should do; they tell qualitative
researchers how they should proceed. By comparison, the reconstructed ideal is com-
pletely silent on this matter: it merely lists the features that a qualitative data set should
ideally end up having. This being the case, it might be argued, a process-oriented ideal
is more useful than—and hence preferable to—the reconstructed notion.
In response, consider that a process-oriented ideal of this kind may always be
rendered compatible with the reconstructed ideal. All it takes is to maintain that the
fact that individual qualitative researchers generated or evaluated their data in certain
ways is constitutive of the objectivity of qualitative research practices rather than
qualitative data sets. Thus, assume that qualitative researchers were equipped with
both the reconstructed ideal and an ideal of objective qualitative research practices.
7 For overview discussions of both notions of objectivity in more general terms, that is, without any focus




In that case, qualitative researchers would know not only what features their data set
should ideally end up having but also how they should, ideally, go about the generation
or evaluationof their data set. These reflections show that the reconstructed ideal should
not be replaced by a process-oriented ideal of objective qualitative data sets. It would
be much more useful to supplement the reconstructed notion with an ideal of objective
qualitative research practices.8
From the perspective of deciding on, or working out, the latter ideal, it may be
noted, it is helpful to be able to turn to the reconstructed ideal. It is reasonable to think
that an ideal of objective qualitative research practices should state how qualitative
researchers should generate or evaluate their data sets such that they likely end up with
an objective qualitative data set. Consequently, it is also useful to be in possession of
an ideal to this effect, viz. the reconstructed notion. It makes it possible to determine
more precisely what constitutes effective research practices to achieve this goal and
to put forward a more systematic and comprehensive ideal of objective qualitative
research practices.
The second kind of process-oriented ideals does not focus on individual ways of
proceeding but on practices at the level of the scientific community. Ideals of this
sort may naturally draw on Longino’s work (Longino 1990). In her view, a scien-
tific community should have recognized avenues for criticism and shared standards
of theory assessment. Further, there should be uptake of criticism and equal sharing
of intellectual authority (ibid. p. 76). Thus organized, a scientific community should
engage in the critical scrutiny of theories with the aim of detecting and rejecting the-
ories that reflect individual researchers’ idiosyncratic values and biases. This account
may easily be modified so that it deals with qualitative data sets rather than theo-
ries. Accordingly, it states that evidence—qualitative data sets—invoked in support of
qualitative research reports should be critically scrutinized by a research community
with the aforementioned features: this will likely result in the detection and rejection
of data sets that reflect idiosyncratic values and biases. Further, it might be elaborated,
a qualitative data set is objective to the extent that it has gone through this process of
critical scrutiny without having been dismissed.9
A process-oriented ideal of this kind might also be recommended on the ground of
its usefulness: it offers guidance as to how a properly organized scientific community
should proceed in order to weed out qualitative data sets that reflect individual qual-
itative researchers’ idiosyncratic values and biases. Because the reconstructed notion
offers no similar advice, it should be rejected in favor of the community-level ideal of
objective qualitative data sets. Or so it may be argued.
Similarly to above, the appropriate response here is to maintain that the process-
oriented ideal should be slightly amended. It should maintain that the critical scrutiny
8 This contention is similar to Chapman and Wylie’s claim that an ideal of objective knowledge claims
should be accompanied by an ideal of objective individual-level research practices (see Chapman andWylie
2016: p. 207ff). Also, the proposal that I present in a second is in line with their view further to add an ideal
of objective scientific community practices.
9 This is parallel toDouglas’ proposal to regard theories as objective to the extent that they have gone through
and survived critical scrutiny by an ideally organized scientific community (Douglas 2004: pp. 463–464).
Longino takes a different view: she sees the engagement in the right kind of critical examination as consti-
tutive of the objectivity of scientific community practices.
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of qualitative data sets by a properly structured scientific community is constitutive
of the objectivity of scientific community practices rather than of objective qualitative
data sets. In this case, the reconstructed ideal of an objective qualitative data set might
be complemented not only by an account of objective individual qualitative research
practices, but also by an ideal of objective communal practices vis-à-vis qualitative
data sets. Clearly, a tripartite account of this sort is more useful—it offers better
guidance—than the community-level ideal of objective qualitative data sets on its
own. Therefore, the reconstructed ideal should also be supplemented by an ideal of
objective scientific community practices.
The reconstructed ideal of an objective qualitative data set also comes in handy
from the perspective of further cashing out such an ideal that bases itself on Longino’s
account. In her characterization of an ideally organized scientific community, Longino
specifies that the community should have shared standards of theory assessment á la
Kuhn’s good-making features of theories (Longino 1990: p. 77). When it comes to an
ideally structured scientific community that critically examines qualitative data sets, its
shared standards may likewise be explicated as standards of evaluation for qualitative
data sets. Since the reconstructed ideal provides a list of (some of) the good-making
features of qualitative data sets, it presents itself as a ready account of what (some of)
the shared standards of evaluation should be for qualitative data sets. In this fashion, it
may be employed to spell out one important aspect of the ideal of objective scientific
community practices.
To recapitulate, the reconstructed ideal should not be replaced by a process-oriented
ideal of objective qualitative data sets. Rather, it should be complemented by ideals of
objective qualitative research practices and objective community practices vis-à-vis
qualitative data sets. From the perspective of working out both these ideals, it is going
to be helpful to be able to draw on the notion of objective qualitative data sets. Taking
on this task, though, is beyond the scope of the present paper.
7 Conclusion
In the first part of this paper, I presented a reconstructed ideal of objective qualitative
data sets. According to it, a qualitative data set is objective to the extent that it, in
conjunction with true assumptions, has a combination of features including descrip-
tive adequacy, reactivity transparency, deception transparency, relevance, balance, and
sufficiency in virtue of which the data set is suited to serve as evidence base for a sat-
isfying answer to the research question under study. I recommended this ideal on the
ground that it may serve as a useful and reachable guiding ideal in qualitative data
generation.
In the second part, I defended the reconstructed ideal against two lines of objections.
In this connection, I stressed that the ideal does not claim to offer an exhaustive list
of objectivity-making features: it may be that further features should be added to the
list. Moreover, I observed that the ideal may usefully be supplemented by ideals of
objective qualitative research practices and objective community practices vis-à-vis
qualitative data sets. This being the case, the reconstructed ideal of objective qualitative
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data sets should be seen as laying the foundation for further work on objectivity in
relation to qualitative data generation.
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